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WAR CRIMES AND THE PROTECTION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES
by
LIEUT. COL. STEVEN J. LEPPER'
First of all let me thank Professor DeSaussure and The University of
Akron for inviting me to talk to you. What I will try to do in the next fifteen
minutes is to condense my experience and the experiences of my colleagues
in Washington in the areas of War Crimes Tribunal and Protection of Peace-
keepers, both of which are very timely subjects in international criminal law.
However, before I do that, let me give the standard government caveat. In no
way should my opinions or comments be construed to be the opinions of the
Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even me if they are wrong.
In preparing for this evening, I turned my thoughts back to an event that
I think was a key one in my military career - the end of the Cold War. I re-
member when the Berlin Wall fell down. I was posted in Europe at the time
and it was a monumental occasion. It was an occasion that brought about
everybody's hope that finally we would have peace; that and the United States
and the Soviet Union would no longer have the threat of nuclear weapons
aimed at each other. We would be able to set the nuclear alarm clock back.
Most Americans were looking forward to investing money traditionally spent
in the defense establishment into domestic programs, hoping we would not
need the same kind of monolithic defense establishment in the future.
Those were great hopes. Unfortunately the last few years have not been
what we all hoped they would be. Since the Cold War ended we have had
Desert Storm, Bosnia (still continues to this day), Somalia (remnants of which
are still around today), and Haiti. Most recently, we witnessed the massacre
of almost one million people in Rwanda. Given these developments, I had to
take a step back and think about what the end of the Cold War really means.
Although we no longer have nuclear weapons pointed at each other, we con-
tinue to have horrendous things happening to people all over the world. This
really is not peace.
As I digested these contradictions, I started thinking some more about
what really happened in the Cold War and came to the conclusion that it was
unreasonable to think that the end of the Cold War would herald peace.
During the Cold War we had Vietnam, Grenada, Panama. We had folks like
Idi Amin killing his own people. Things have not changed that much, at least
in terms of what people are doing to each other around the world. What has
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changed though - a change that is important to understand in context of what
I will be talking about this evening - is the fact that the international commu-
nity now is a bit better prepared to deal with those issues than it used to be.
The best example of this progress is that we no longer have a Security
Council that is bogged down in superpower politics with the United States or
Soviet Union, opposing each other when either wants to respond to some of
the atrocities occurring around the world. Today we have a Security Coun-
cil that establishes a war crimes tribunal for Bosnia and that last week put
together a war crimes tribunal for Rwanda. Things that were not even con-
ceivable during the Cold War are now happening.
Another positive, post-Cold War development is the international
community's increased willingness to intervene in conflicts flaring up around
the world, to stop genocide in places like Rwanda and Somalia, to reinstall the
legitimate government of Haiti, to stop the aggression of people like Saddam
Hussein. We are now more willing to respond to these crises more effectively
than ever before. This new world order forms the backdrop for the two top-
ics of my talk tonight: war crimes and protection of the people who are now
being sent to intervene in the hot spots around the world.
I am sure that most of you are aware of the Nuremburg and Tokyo war
crimes tribunals convened by the Allies after World War II. Since then, the
world has not engaged in the international prosecution of war crimes or inter-
national crimes. Although we have established a number of crimes that are
now considered international crimes, we have not really prosecuted anyone
in an international forum - that is, until the prospect recently appeared in the
form of the Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal.
The Bosnia Tribunal is the first international mechanism since World
War II in which the international community can enforce international law.
From time to time, various countries have enforced international criminal law
themselves. The Calley case, for example, involved a U.S. prosecution of a
U.S. military member for alleged war crimes. Similarly, Israel prosecuted
World War II Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann well after the war ended.
However, Bosnia and Rwanda now present opportunities for the international
community to demonstrate its resolve that international crimes must be ad-
dressed by all nations.
I would like to tell you a brief story about how the Bosnia War Crimes
Tribunal was established, and to try to fold into that story a discussion of the
kinds of issues that arose then and that are also being raised and considered
today. Ideas about establishing a tribunal began in 1991 when the world was
inundated with stories from the press about the brutality in Bosnia. It was at
this time that the United States started reporting to the U.N. Security Coun-
cil and the Secretary General the kind of atrocities that were occurring. As an
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initial step, the United States pressed for the establishment of a commission
of experts to look into the atrocities that were being committed in the former
Yugoslavia. After it confirmed many of the allegations of ethnic cleansing
and other brutality, the United States pressed for an international tribunal. A
great deal of credit for this tribunal really goes to Ambassador Madeline
Albright, who forcefully encourages her colleagues in the Security Council
to accept the proposition that the international community needed to step in
and address these atrocities. On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 827 establishing the tribunal.
Tonight, I want to briefly discuss three aspects of the tribunal: structure,
jurisdiction and U.S. participation in its creation. Many of you are probably
aware that the tribunal consists of three chambers. The judicial chamber is
comprised of five appellate judges and two trial panels of three judges each.
The United States has a judge - Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald - who, before
she went to the Hague was a federal district court judge and a professor at the
Thurgood Marshall School of Law in Houston. I had an opportunity to meet
her and brief her on some tribunal issues we in the U.S. government were
working on.
Judge Richard Goldstone is the second prosecutor elected to that posi-
tion. His predecessor was a Venezuelan lawyer who left shortly after his
appointment. Judge Goldstone is a very highly regarded South African ju-
rist who earned his reputation for fairness in his investigation of the excesses
of apartheid. The international community is fortunate to have his services.
He is an independent prosecutor, assisted by a staff of about seventy people,
twenty-two of whom are Americans. The U.S. government sent twenty-two
government employees to serve the tribunal as investigators and prosecutors.
The Department of Defense sent six people over two lawyers, two judge ad-
vocates (military lawyers), and six military investigators to assist in the inves-
tigation of war crimes. Finally, there is a registry or clerk of court.
The jurisdiction of the tribunal is really interesting. There are several
aspects: First, the tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction includes war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and violations of the laws and customs of
war. This jurisdiction is a bit broader than Nuremberg's in some respects and
a bit narrower in others. As an example of its narrow charter, the crime of
aggression is not included in the Bosnia tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction.
An example of its broader scope is its jurisdiction over the crime of genocide
- a crime defined after World War II.
The second aspect of jurisdiction is the tribunal's personal jurisdiction.
The tribunal has the jurisdiction to prosecute any person who planned, insti-
gated, ordered, committed, or otherwise engaged in the planning preparation
or execution of a crime within its subject matter jurisdiction. Although supe-
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rior orders is not a defense - at least it is not a complete defense - it can be
raised to mitigate punishment. There are other interesting issues here that I
can go into later if there are any questions. For example, the statute establish-
ing the tribunal also incorporates the principle of command responsibility -
the principle that commanders are responsible for the crimes of their troops.
A third aspect of jurisdiction is the tribunal's concurrent jurisdiction. In
this regard, the tribunal enjoys a superior/subordinate relationship with indi-
vidual states. Many of you may have read last week in the national press
where the prosecutor, Judge Goldstone, went to the court to the tribunal to ask
it to intercede in a war crimes case that was then being prosecuted in Germany.
A concentration camp commandant visiting his brother in January last year
was arrested and is being held there pending trial in a German court. Under
its statute, the tribunal can step in and supersede any national exercise of
jurisdiction. That is what it has done here. We may soon see the first tribu-
nal prosecution.
The U.S. Government played a significant role in the establishment of
the tribunal. We sent investigation teams over to Bosnia and collected evi-
dence against individuals who were alleged to have committed war crimes.
We turned that evidence over to the Commission of Experts, which used much
of it for its report. I mentioned earlier our loan of twenty-two U.S. personnel.
Finally, one particular contribution that I am personally really proud of is the
effort we undertook to draft proposed rules of evidence and procedure for the
tribunal.
We recognized very early that regardless of how far this tribunal went,
whatever it did, it would set a precedent in international law. In this regard,
we were particularly concerned that the tribunal statute left it to the judges to
come up with their own rules for procedure and evidence. We were concerned
about what kind of rules they would come up with.
The tribunal's judges come from a number of different systems of law,
primarily civil law systems. Those of us in uniform were concerned that if
whatever they drafted became a precedent, it may someday govern the pros-
ecution of our own people. We therefore undertook a nine month effort to
draft some rules that served ultimately as the U.S. government's proposal to
the tribunal. I and several other government lawyers went down to see Judge
McDonald shortly after her appointment to present her our product. The U.S.
Government thereafter submitted our rules to the tribunal in The Hague and
it formed the basis for what ultimately became the tribunal's rules of proce-
dures and evidence.
Our forecast that these rules would be of precedent and value was just
realized last week. The statute for the Rwanda tribunal basically incorporated
without modification the Bosnia tribunal's rules of procedures and evidence.
[Vol. 28:3
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So we now see this snowball effect, and we suspect that if these prosecutions
are successful, perhaps the international community will also look to these
tribunals as examples of what permanent international tribunal should look
like. The rules of procedure and evidence, which are extremely important as
those of you who are learning law are beginning to understand, may therefore
ultimately become the centerpiece of a permanent international judicial sys-
tem.
Let me now switch gears briefly to peacekeeper protection. I recently
had the honor and privilege of being a member of the U.S. Delegation to the
United Nations' effort to negotiate a convention for protection of peacekeep-
ers.
Some of you may recall Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant whose
helicopter was shot down over Mogadishu. After he was captured by Somali
forces, we recognized a little too late that there was really no international law
to protect him. The Geneva Conventions did not apply - at least the ones
protecting prisoners of war - because this was not an international armed
conflict. So, we were left with a gap in international law. What we are try-
ing to do right now is to fill that gap. This convention, news of which you may
see in coming weeks as it is considered by the U.N. General Assembly, is an
effort to fill that gap by establishing as an international crime any attacks
against or detention of U.N. personnel.
This post-Cold War era has introduced a new form of warfare. Back in
1949 when we negotiated the Geneva Conventions, and in 1977 when we
negotiated the Geneva protocols, we had in mind a very different kind of
military operation than what we are confronted with today. Now we are con-
fronted with things called peacekeeping operations, or peace enforcement
operations, conducted under Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. By
their very nature they are very different from war because forces we provide
are generally not parties to an armed conflict - they are there merely to keep
the conflict's parties apart. So, one can argue that the Geneva Conventions
do not protect U.N. forces because they are not engaged as combatants. It is
this kind of new thinking and new philosophy that we are now starting to come
to grips with. This convention is one way in which we are trying to deal with
the problem of U.N. peacekeepers being attacked all around the world.
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